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means after an analysis of the statute and a review of applicable legislative history.”5 This
created an imbalance between the circuits, and courts have implemented a variety of tests
throughout the years to decide undue hardship cases.6 Presently, all student loans are subject to
the undue hardship standard, and the two main tests applied by the courts are the Brunner test
and the totality of the circumstances test.7
Because the undue hardship standard was enacted without guidance on how to evaluate it,
two questions arise: (1) whether it is possible to discharge student loan debt, and (2) how have
courts applied the differing standards in determining whether to discharge student loan debt?
This memorandum will examine the two undue hardship standards. Part I discusses both the
Brunner test and totality of the circumstances test. Part II assesses how the standards compare to
each other.
I.

The Two Undue Hardship Standards
A. The Brunner Test
The Second Circuit first adopted the Brunner test in Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ.

Servs. Corp.,8 and the standard is currently the majority view.9 Under Brunner, a court will
consider the following three elements: “(1) that the debtor cannot maintain, based on current
income and expenses, a ‘minimal’ standard of living for herself and her dependents if forced to
repay the loans; (2) that additional circumstances exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely
to persist for a significant portion of the repayment period of the student loans; and (3) that the
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debtor has made good faith efforts to repay the loans.”10 If a court finds that the debtor has not
satisfied any of the three prongs of the test, the student loan is not dischargeable.11
B. Application of the Brunner Test
Applying the Brunner standard for the first time, the Second Circuit denied a discharge of
the debtor’s student loan debt.12 Specifically, the debtor obtained a Master’s degree and owed
$9,000 in student loans.13 She filed for bankruptcy seven months after receiving her Master’s
degree.14 Two months later, as soon as the grace period on her loans had expired, she filed an
adversary proceeding seeking discharge of her student loans.15 She was unemployed and
receiving government assistance.16 Furthermore, she alleged that she sent her resume to more
than one hundred places in her field of study, and she was seeing a therapist for depression and
anxiety.17
The bankruptcy court found that, although the debtor was unemployed and unable to
obtain employment in her field of study, she had no dependents or other burdens hindering her
from finding other work and paying off her loans.18 The court further found that an inability to
pay the loans or meet minimal expenses at the time was not enough to find undue hardship, and
it was unlikely that her inability would extend for a significant part of the repayment period.19
Moreover, the court found that the debtor had not demonstrated a good faith effort to pay her
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loans.20 The court emphasized the fact that she filed for a discharge within one month of when
her first payment was due, and she did not request a deferment, which was the “less drastic
remedy” available to her.21
In contrast, Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Polleys22 demonstrates a successful discharge
case under the Brunner analysis.23 The debtor in Polleys was a 45-year-old single mother who
owed approximately $51,000 in student loans.24 She was unable to maintain employment using
her degree, and she suffered from a mental illness.25 The court rejected the totality of the
circumstances test, stating that the test “has an unfortunate tendency to generate lists of factors
that . . . grow ever longer as the case law develops.”26 The court held that the debtor was entitled
to a discharge under the Brunner test primarily because of her mental health issues, which
prevented her from maintaining steady employment.27
C. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
The Eighth Circuit introduced the totality of the circumstances test in Andrews v. S.D.
Student Loan Assistance Corp. (In re Andrews),28 where the court expressed its preference for a
less restrictive standard.29 The test includes an evaluation of: “(1) the debtor's past, present, and
reasonably reliable future financial resources; (2) the debtor's reasonable and necessary living
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expenses; and (3) any other relevant facts and circumstances.”30 Only the First and Eighth
Circuits currently apply this minority standard.31
When analyzing the first and second factors of the totality of the circumstances test,
debtors are expected to present evidence showing “that they have done everything possible to
minimize expenses and maximize income . . . .”32 Overall, if a debtor’s future financial
resources will adequately cover payment of the student loans while still providing the debtor
with a minimal standard of living, then the debt will not be discharged.33 This analysis requires
the court to consider a range of facts, including the debtor’s current employment and financial
situation as well as the possibility of future changes in the debtor’s situation.34 Additionally, a
court will consider the debtor’s health, age, education, number of dependents, and other personal
circumstances.35 No factor is dispositive under the totality of the circumstances standard.36
Under the third part of the totality of the circumstances test, when considering other
relevant facts and circumstances, a court can consider a broad range of relevant information “that
would be persuasive to overcome the income and expense analysis of undue hardship under the
first two factors . . . .”37 Courts have considered the following under this inquiry:
(1) total present and future incapacity to pay debts for reasons not within the
control of the debtor; (2) whether the debtor has made a good faith effort to
30
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negotiate a deferment or forbearance of payment; (3) whether the hardship will be
long-term; (4) whether the debtor has made payments on the student loan; (5)
whether there is permanent or long-term disability of the debtor; (6) the ability of
the debtor to obtain gainful employment in the area of the study; (7) whether the
debtor has made a good faith effort to maximize income and minimize expenses;
(8) whether the dominant purpose of the bankruptcy petition was to discharge the
student loan; and (9) the ratio of student loan debt to total indebtedness.38
D. Application of the Totality of the Circumstances Test
Demonstrating how a court applies the totality of the circumstances test, the Eighth
Circuit allowed a debtor to discharge her student loan debt in In re Fern.39 The case involved a
debtor, Sara Fern, who owed $27,000 in student loans that she borrowed for two separate
educational programs.40 One of the programs she did not complete, and the other program did
not lead to profitable employment.41 Fern was a single mother of three children, received no
financial support from their fathers, and often lived at a deficit.42 Consequently, she contended
that the student loan debt was a mental and emotional burden.43 Additionally, Fern was
receiving food stamps and rental assistance from the government.44 The court found that Fern
was maximizing her current earning potential and did not have any unnecessary expenses for a
mother raising three children on her own.45 Conversely, the creditors argued that because there
were income-based repayment plans available to Fern, a finding of undue hardship was not
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warranted.46 The court disagreed, however, holding that the payment plans imposed an
additional burden on Fern.47
Applying the totality of the circumstances test, the Fern court found that the debtor’s
past, present, and reasonably reliable future financial resources supported a finding of undue
hardship.48 Fern never earned more than $25,000 a year and was relying on family support and
government assistance.49 Furthermore, there was sufficient evidence showing that she was
maximizing her income.50 The court also found that her expenses were reasonable and
necessary, weighing in favor of discharge.51 In addition, the court concluded that the repayment
plans proposed by the creditors would impose hardship, and there was a very low probability that
Fern would ever make significant payments.52 Accordingly, the court held that, under the
totality of the circumstances test, Fern was entitled to a discharge of her student loan debt.53
E. Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Affirming In re Fern and Contrasting an
Unsuccessful Discharge Case
The Unites States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower
court’s decision in In re Fern, holding that under the totality of the circumstances, Fern’s student
loans were dischargeable based upon undue hardship.54 The court explained that the Eighth
Circuit “follows a more flexible approach under a totality of the circumstances test” and has
“expressly rejected” the Brunner test.55 Further, the court contrasted Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp.
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v. Jesperson,56 where the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed a
finding of undue hardship, applying the totality of the circumstances test.57 Jesperson involved a
lawyer who owed more than $300,000 in student loans.58 The Court of Appeals examined many
facts to determine that the debtor did not qualify for a discharge.59 Most importantly, the debtor
could afford a monthly payment of $629 under a repayment plan, and he did not have any
dependents.60 Moreover, the court held that there were “self-imposed conditions which limited
his monthly income and a failure to pay any amount on the student loan when he had sufficient
income to do so.”61
Conversely, Fern was never required to make a payment due to her circumstances, and
her monthly payment would remain zero under a repayment plan.62 Accordingly, the court
refused to interpret Jesperson to hold that a monthly payment obligation of zero per month
constituted an ability to pay.63 The In re Fern decision ascertains that a discharge of student loan
debt is possible under the totality of the circumstances standard; however, the debtor’s situation
must warrant a discharge.64 The courts will look at a variety of factors and will only grant a
discharge if it is sufficiently justified.65
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II.

Comparing the Undue Hardship Standards
The Brunner test and the totality of the circumstances test have some similarities.66

Specifically, both standards focus on the same main concepts: the debtor’s ability to repay and
the debtor’s conduct.67 However, the totality of the circumstances test is viewed as less
restrictive because it permits a consideration of a wide range of factors.68 In contrast to the
Brunner test, no factor is dispositive under the totality of the circumstances standard.69
Furthermore, unlike the Brunner standard, a court applying the totality of the circumstances test
is not required to consider whether the debtor made good faith efforts to pay the loans.70 Under
the good faith analysis of the Brunner test, courts have considered the following factors:
(1) whether the failure to repay the student loan was due to circumstances beyond
the debtor's reasonable control; (2) whether the debtor has used all available
resources to repay the loan; (3) whether the debtor is using her best efforts to
maximize her earnings potential; (4) how long after the loan was incurred did the
debtor seek to discharge the debts; (5) what the overall percentage of the student
loan debt is compared to debtor's overall debt; and (6) whether or not the debtor
has gained tangible benefits of the student loan.71
Bankruptcy courts have analyzed both tests and many have held that the Brunner test is
too strict and certain aspects are not supported by the text of section 523(a)(8), which was
enacted to prevent abuses of the educational loan system and to protect the viability of student

66

See Brunner v. N.Y. State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. 831 F.2d 395, 396 (2d Cir. 1987); Fern v.
FedLoan Servicing (In re Fern), 553 B.R. 362, 367 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2016), aff’d, 563 B.R. 1
(B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2017).
67
See Weir v. Paige (In re Weir), 296 B.R. 710, 716 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2002) (“Regardless of the
test used in determining whether repayment of student loans constitutes undue hardship under §
523(a)(8), at a minimum the court must focus on two issues: (1) the economic prospects of the
debtor and (2) whether the conduct of the debtor disqualifies the debtor from taking advantage of
the exception.”).
68
See In re Fern, 553 B.R. at 367.
69
See Morgan v. United States Dept. of Higher Educ. (In re Morgan), 247 B.R. 776, 782 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 2000).
70
See id.
71
Hart v. ECMC (In re Hart), 438 B.R. 406, 413 (E.D. Mich. 2010).
9

loan programs.72 Specifically, under the second prong of the Brunner test, courts have required
the debtor to prove that there are “unique” or “extraordinary” circumstances establishing a
“certainty of hopelessness.”73 Circumstances have included the debtor’s age, sickness, disability,
large number of dependents, absence of practical job skills, and limited education.74 Some
courts have held that a debtor who is unable to show one of these extraordinary circumstances
fails on the second prong of the test and, therefore, the student loans will not be discharged.75
Additionally, the totality of the circumstances test and the Brunner test both result
in a substantial amount of discretion and subjectivity by the courts.76 Courts have
rejected the totality of the circumstances test, explaining that the analysis does not
necessarily avoid the Brunner test’s harsh standard.77 Moreover, courts have adopted the
Brunner standard with modifications.78 Particularly, in Polleys, the Tenth Circuit adopted
the Brunner test, but distinguished its test from the Second Circuit by stating that under
the second element, the debtor does not need to demonstrate a “certainty of
hopelessness.”79
CONCLUSION
Although the totality of the circumstances test is less restrictive, discharging
student loan debt is possible under both the totality of the circumstances standard as well
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as the Brunner standard.80 Furthermore, the two tests overlap and consider some of the
same factors.81 The Brunner standard is the majority approach, but the test varies in each
circuit’s application.82 Therefore, a successful discharge case in one circuit does not
necessarily mean that a similar case will be successful in another circuit that also applies
the Brunner standard.83

Regardless of whether a court applies the totality of the

circumstances test or the Brunner test, each case will depend on that specific circuit’s
application of the undue hardship analysis.
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